HIGHLIGHTS OF VIOLENCE IN KOKRAJHAR DISTRICT OF ASSAM
Acts of violence and terror are not new to Kokrajhar district of Assam. The entire Bodoland movement and the struggle has been very aggressive and violent in many ways. As I was researching on the socialist background on such event I came across an article written by Mr. Abhishek who has done an extensive study on this violence which I would like to present in this article.
Muslims of Bengali origin have been mercilessly targeted—with more than 30 persons killed in two days—and mudslinging has continued ever since, unabated. Media reports have said that the non-Bodo organisations in the BTAD which fielded a non-tribal candidate (ex-ULFA member Hira Sarania) in the ongoing General Elections, in Kokrajhar district, has alleged that the minorities were targeted just because they did not vote for the Bodo candidate.
Muslims of Bengali origin have been mercilessly targeted—with more than 30 persons killed in two days—and mudslinging has continued ever since, unabated. Media reports have said that the non-Bodo organisations in the BTAD which fielded a non-tribal candidate (ex-ULFA member Hira Sarania) in the ongoing General Elections, in Kokrajhar district, has alleged that the minorities were targeted just because they did not vote for the Bodo candidate.
Though the Assam government promptly decided
to hand over the investigations into the riots to the National Investigation
Agency (NIA), the truth remains that the recent spate of violent attacks on the
Muslims of Bengali origin in the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC), is not an
isolated event, or a sudden outburst of violence. To say the least, it is but
the fall out of a very complex autonomy-movement that has gripped Assam since
1987, when, frustrated by the AGP government’s neglect towards the development
of indigenous communities, Bodos under the leadership of the All Bodo Students
Union (ABSU) came up with a fresh demand for a separate State called Bodoland.
The ABSU was at that time led by Upendra Nath Brahma, who coined the term
“divide Assam fifty-fifty.”
Bodos, the single largest tribal community in
Assam—around 6 percent of the population, have been fighting for a separate
State since 1967 under the banner of the political party PTCA which was backed
by the ABSU. Along with the PTCA, the Bodo Sahitya Sabha also played an
instrumental role in the Bodo struggle prior to 1987.
1993 Bodo
Accord
In 1993, came a high-point for the Bodoland
struggle—the Bodo Accord was signed by the All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) and
its political wing, the Bodo People’s Action Committee (BPAC), with the Assam
government in February 1993. Though they gave up the demand for a separate
State while signing the Accord, it empowered the Bodos and facilitated the
formation of the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC).
The provisions for the formation of the BTAD
were that villages which have more than 50 per cent Bodo population should be
included. But later, villages with fewer Bodo populations were also included to
ensure territorial contiguity.
Moreover, the Accord did not demarcate
completely the territory which would be included under the Council. And that,
led “to all kinds of confusion and resentment among the Bodo groups, their
leaders and the Bodo masses.”
As a consequence, the ABSU withdrew its
agreement on the Accord and renewed its demand for a separate State.
Parallel to these political movements for a
Bodo separate State, several armed organisations also evolved— initially the
United Tribal Nationalist Liberation Front (UTNLF) formed in April 1984, and
the Bodo Security Force formed in October 1986. Later, the Bodo Security Force
changed its name to the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) in 1993,
and the Bodo Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF) was formed in June 1996.
Spearheaded by the BLTF and the NDFB a series of violent attacks, killings and
massacres occurred, even within the different factions fighting for the
ultimate goal of a separate State. And, into some of the large-scale killings
we will look into in the next chapters.
2003 second
Bodo Accord
On March 15, 2000, a formal cessation on the
part of the agitating organisations was announced and the second Bodo Accord
was signed by the BLTF (which played a more important role in the entire deal
rather than the ABSU and other unarmed groups), Central government and State
government in 2003. Consequently on December 6, 2003, “a total of 2,630 BLT
cadres laid down arms, which included 508 assorted weapons and 17,137 different
pieces of ammunitions.”
This second Accord led to the creation of an
autonomous self-governing body of the Bodos—the Bodoland Territorial Council
(BTC) within the State of Assam. The area under the BTC jurisdiction is called
the Bodo Territorial Autonomous District (BTAD). The Accord also agreed “to
provide constitutional protection under the Sixth Schedule to the said
Autonomous Body; to fulfil economic, educational and linguistic aspiration and
the preservation of land-rights, socio-cultural and ethnic identity of the
Bodos; and speed up the infrastructure development in BTC area.”
In fact, by this Accord to new districts
Chirang and Baksa were formed, a proper boundary of the BTAD was affixed.
But the catch remains that in many areas under
the BTC and the BTAD, the Bodos are minorities, sometimes forming only around
30 percent of the total population of the BTAD area.
Post 2003
After 2003, the struggle for a Bodoland went
through several ups and downs. The different groups fighting for the Bodos got
divided and separate factions came up—often with conflicts between each other.
The Bodoland People’s Progressive Front (BPPF)
came up to rule the BTC, but unfortunately got divided into two factions—the
BPPF (Hagrama), led by Hagrama Mahilary, the erstwhile BLT chief and chief
executive member of the ad hoc BTC, and BPPF (Rabiram), led by Rabiram Narzary,
former ABSU president. The first elections to the BTC saw violent clashes
between the two factions, but Hagrama won at the end.
Hagrama’s faction was renamed as Bodoland
People’s Front (BPF), and till date the BPF continues to be a coalition partner
in the Tarun Gogoi led Congress government in the State.
Meanwhile, the NDFB also got divided into two
factions– NDFB (Progressive) and the other faction as the NDFB (Ranjan
Daimary). Ranjan Daimary was the founder chairman of the organisation, who,
expelled from the party, formed his own faction in 2009.
It is important to understand that the
struggle for a separate State of the Bodos, originates from the fact that they
have been historically subjugated at the hands of the Assamese leadership and
they fear a loss of identity. But at the same time, it’s crucial to realise
that an enormous amount of violent acts have also occurred, painting the entire
movement with blood and gore.
The political commentator Udayon Misra in his
article Bodoland: The Burden of History in
the Economic and Political Weekly,
explains how “the creation of a particular ethnic homeland without ensuring the
constitutional rights of the other communities living in the region” was the
genesis of the series of extremely violent instances of ethnic and communal
clashes, especially against the Santhals and the immigrant Muslims, that ensued
thereafter.
Incidents of
violence
The first instance of violence post the 1993
Accord was in October that year when more than 100 people were killed and
another 18,000 rendered homeless following clashes between Bodos and Muslims of
East Bengal origin in the Kokrajhar and Bongaigaon districts of Assam.
Then, after a lull of six months, the ugly
face of ethnic violence again surfaced in Kokrajhar district. There, on May 27,
1994, Bodo militants set fire to the houses of Muslim families. News reports
said that 22 Muslims were killed, more than 100 were injured, 7,000 made
homeless and four villages burnt down. The army and paramilitary forces were
deployed in Kokrajhar district following the incident. The attack was
perpetrated by the Bodo Security Force (BSF).
In the series of massacres in 1993-94 perhaps
the worst was the targeted killings of Bengali Muslim peasants by Bodo
militants in July 1994 in Barpeta district of lower Assam.
In the Barpeta massacre around 1,000 people,
mostly women and children were killed, around 60 villages were reduced to ashes
and left more than 70,000 people internally displaced. What makes this massacre
the most barbaric is the fact that, apart from killing the victims in their
houses, fields and forests, Bodo militants massacred them in a relief camp
also.
The next major instance of ethnic violence
occurred in 2008. In the riots that continued over a period of two
months—August to October, 2008—in Udalguri and Darrang districts of Assam. A
few sporadic incidents were also reported in Chirang and Baksa districts. In
totality, around 100 people were killed and more than 1, 00,000 rendered
homeless, majority of who were Bengali Muslims.
Then, what happened in 2008 retuned, with a
far devastating effect, in July 2012.
Violent ethnic riots starting from July 21,
2012 between Bodos and Bengali Muslims in Kokrajhar, Dhubri and to some extent
in Chirang districts left around 100 people dead and 4, 00, 000 people in
the 286 relief camps- 178 of them in the Muslim-dominated Dhubri district and
108 camps in the Bodo-dominated Kokrajhar district, at the peak of the crisis.
Attacked Muslims from Kokrajhar district took shelter in the relief camps of
Dhubri district while riot-stuck Bodos from Dhubri district moved to the safer
Kokrajhar relief camps. And these relief camps were ill provisioned and lacked
even basic human amenities.
Conclusion
Samrat, a North-East born journalist and
author, wrote in his article on the 2012 riots in The
New York Times:
The Bodos
are set upon carving out their homeland. The Bengali Muslims are in need of
living space. The ethnic Assamese and the government of India are at odds with
both groups. It is a volatile matrix. The riots may end at some point, but the
struggles will go on.
Indeed, it really is a ‘volatile matrix’.
The long narrative of ethnic and communal
riots in Assam proves all over again how complex the demography of the state
is.
In addition to its original, highly
heterogeneous ethnic composition, the fear of the ‘other’ has been laid bare to
the leeching manipulation of sectarian and identity politics. And, this wave of
identity movements, often taking chauvinistic turns, bred alienation among
communities and encouraged desperate measures, often violent ones, to protect
whatever was one’s own. The greed for power, through the manipulation of
communal and sectarian sentiments, never let the political leaders stop for a
while and reflect upon how millions could die following a slight instigation.
Initiatives undertaken by consecutive governments
in Guwahati or New Delhi for wholesome and inclusive development of indigenous
communities in Assam have been dismal. No solid step for guaranteeing land
rights to the tribals have come up by either the State or Centre. Even when
such steps have come up, the administration failed to implement them
effectively.
Communal politics that’s mainly played in the
Indian heartland involved itself with the Assam riots of 2012, and that is
something really disturbing. Arch leaders of both the Hindu Right as well as
Islamic fundamentalist parties visited the riot-affected areas—Asaduddin
Owaisi, president of the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen, infamous for
his hate speech, as well as Pravin Togadia, International Working President of
the Vishwa Hindu Parishad.
The recurrence of ethnic violence, which was
also communal to some extent, shows that when political and administrative
measures are half-hearted a problem can continue to inflict immense pain into
the lives of millions of people even through three decades. Identity crisis,
struggle for land and vote-bank politics, all played their own roles in stoking
the flames of communal and ethnic violence alive and keeping it alive.
If instead of answering fundamental questions
bothering indigenous communities for so long, communal politicians find just
another avenue to gain votes, the situation will only be exacerbated.
On the crisis that Assam has been facing due
to riots and massacres erupting out of clashes between the Muslim settler
community and indigenous tribals, the political scientist Nani Gopal Mahanta
has commented that ‘in lieu of accepting the immigrants as a part of greater
Assamese society, the Indian state should provide political and cultural
protection to the indigenous groups of Assam’.
What Mahanta suggests is the fact that a
skewed or a one sided policy of appeasement towards a section of society
against another does not hold the key to a peaceful Assam. Neither does the
futile politics of blame-games and vitriolic rhetoric solve anything.
The most basic step towards solving communal
and sectarian strife is a holistic understanding of the roots and the complex
history of the people of Assam.
REFRENCEhttps://indiaresists.com/violence-in-assam-will-we-ever-learn/
VIVIAN LOPES
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